№8

HONOURS REVIEW

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We will work for four, or five, or even six solid years after which we can call ourselves graduates of the University of Groningen, certified experts in our respective fields of study. But why – in our hearts of hearts – do we often not quite feel that way?

Education is transformational. In the beginning the concepts are foreign, but then, almost imperceptibly, that will change and we become equipped in the theories we are taught. But inevitably we will never stop wondering if there is something else we should know. As Voltaire puts it: "The more I read, the more I acquire, the more certain I am that I know nothing".

The truth is that the volume and complexity of the knowledge we want to master is exponentially beyond our capacity as individuals. We will not master and understand it all. But then again, no one ever will. To learn is simply to broaden, to experience more and snatch new aspects of life. New knowledge is not only power, it is happiness. That is why it is essential to keep moving, to keep learning and evolving. Socrates already knew that "education is the kindling of a flame, not the filling of a vessel." So drink in our newest articles and relight your fire.

- Mariëlle Kloosterman

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ANN-SOPHIE FREUND

Field of study
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION

Discipline
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Language – we effortlessly use it in our everyday lives to communicate. We are seemingly in complete control of how we employ it, be it for expressing gratitude, sadness or even insult. We simply use words to express what we think - or so we believe. In her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" (1987), Carol Cohn argues that language is by no means a simple tool for communication. It can have great influence on the way its speakers think and, subsequently, act. [1]

"We simply use words to express what we think - or so we believe."

> *“Language can have far-reaching consequences, well beyond common expectations.”*

Cohn builds her argumentation around one particular language, which she calls the technostrategic language, that is used by defense intellectuals, a group of professionals in defense discourse, more specifically, in the field of nuclear arms. According to Cohn, the technostrategic language affects the way defense intellectuals conceive of, think about, and decide on nuclear issues.(1) This statement implies that language can have far-reaching consequences, well beyond common expectations. If the language of defense intellectuals affects the way they think and consequently decide on nuclear issues, this would imply that language has the power to influence global politics.

Nuclear arms no longer play the role they used to, but Cohn´s idea may be applied to other, more current aspects of global politics, such as the present “refugee crisis” in Europe. It is of relevance to examine the relationship between language and thought – how they influence one another – more closely. This essay investigates Cohn’s theory on the reciprocal influence of thoughts and technostrategic language of defense intellectuals by applying it to recent linguistics. First, Cohn´s paper will be introduced in greater detail, next relevant linguistic background information will be provided. Finally, this linguistic background will be applied to the idea of technostrategic language and its implications in our current times.

Technostrategic language describes a specific language based on English. While it sounds like English to outsiders, it is a language especially employed by defense intellectuals (see **nuclear arms**), which uses certain linguistic devices and has an own vocabulary. This vocabulary entails many terms related to the technology and strategic thinking of nuclear arms. Cohn, who coined the term, wanted it to show how intertwined and interrelated these two, the nuclear strategic thinking and technology of nuclear arms, are.

According to Cohn, defense intellectuals are men that work in government, the military, at universities and multiple other institutions involved in US **nuclear arms** issues. They look for ways to deal with nuclear weapons and argue that nuclear arms are necessary as they are the only way to deter other nuclear powers from attacking. Defense discourse describes the communication between defense intellectuals.

Technostrategic language

Carol Cohn, a feminist international relations scholar, discusses the influences of language on its speakers. While working in a defense and technology center in the United States for one year during the late Cold War, Cohn discovered that the defense intellectuals who were working there used a specialized language variant, which she called technostrategic.(1) She found that this language contains several linguistic devices that have a particularly strong effect on its speakers. The first device is the use of abstractions in the form of abbreviations, such as BAMBI, meaning Ballistic Missile Boost Interception.(1) Cohn suggests that such concepts elicit positive feelings, in order to distance the speakers from the grisly reality they are discussing. Euphemisms are a further device that Cohn introduces. Terms such as “clean bombs” or “damage limitation weapon” evoke the idea that these potentially extremely destructive nuclear weapons are much less harmful than they actually are.(1) Finally, Cohn shows how sexual metaphors are used, such as the expression that a country loses its “virginity” when it uses a nuclear bomb for the first time.(1)

According to Cohn, using these linguistic devices turns discussions about nuclear arms, and especially those about their consequences, into strictly technical conversations, masking

the lives of thousands of people that are at stake.[1] She claims that speakers no longer think about the consequences of their actions in the same way they would have done using a non-technostrategic language, and that these consequences are thus trivialised.[1] Further, technostrategic language does not allow for certain ideas or thoughts to be expressed or considered. Her most prominent example is that of peace: the word "peace" itself does not exist in technostrategic language. The closest translation is "strategic stability"; however, this concept always assumes stability within the realm of nuclear arms and does not allow for a notion of peace without these arms.[1]
Cohn states that if one were to try to use the word "peace" nonetheless, one would not be heard, let alone accepted by the defense intellectuals.[1] Someone using the word "peace" would be branded as a "softheaded activist".[2] In this context, Cohn also discovered that she could not use ordinary language (read English) to speak to the defense analysts, as when she tried they would act as if she were ignorant or simple-minded. To communicate and to be respected, she *had* to use the technostrategic language. Cohn argues that the technostrategic language influences and structures its speakers' thoughts: "I have come to believe that this language both reflects and shapes the nature of the American nuclear strategic project, that it plays a central role in allowing defense intellectuals to think and act as they do."[1]

A linguistic approach

Examining Cohn's argumentation from a linguistic perspective, it becomes apparent that she argues from what linguists call a Whorfian or linguistic relativity point of view. Whorfianism assumes that thought is determined by the language a person speaks.[3] Much research supports the Whorfian claim.[4] Psycholinguist Peter Gordon, for example, examined the use of number words in an isolated Amazonian tribe, the Piraha.[4] The Piraha have only three number words respectively describing "very few", "slightly more", and "many". Gordon's experiment showed that the Piraha had difficulties with the concept of exact counting, especially with numbers in high ranges.[4] From this result Gordon inferred an argument in favour of Whorfianism: The Piraha could not conceive the concept of exact numbers because they lacked number words in their language. Since they did not have a linguistic system of numbers, they could not understand the concept of numbering in an exact and precise sense.[4]

The Whorfian claim is contested, as some linguists believe that the influence of language on thought is actually only very small.[5] They claim that even if a language does not have a word for a certain concept, this does not mean that its speakers cannot comprehend the idea of that concept. This argument has been supported by research. For example, in Greek there are two different words for what is called "light blue" and "dark blue" in English. When shown one of these shades of blue, Greek speakers named the specific colour word, whereas English speakers simply described it as "blue". Yet, when shown both shades of blue, even English speakers could differentiate between them. This shows that while language can influence its speakers´ attentiveness to a certain concept, that concept can be understood even if there is no word for it in a particular language.[6]

How does this relate to Cohn´s idea of technostrategic language? It suggests that even if there is no word for peace, defense intellectuals can still understand the concept. It is important to note that according to this line of thought, defense intellectuals could theoretically understand the notion of peace, even in the realm of technostrategic language variety alone. Outside of the English language, even if this is not an issue, as all speakers of technostrategic language are also speakers of English. While they would presumably develop the concept themselves more quickly if they had a term for peace, they can express the concept through circumscriptions. However, could one not also argue from an entirely reversed point of view – that it is not language that influences thought in the first place, but that thought influences

a language and its development? Thus, one could assume that the Piraha simply do not need a cohesive number system in their everyday lives, and so they do not think about such a system and, therefore, never developed one in their language. This could also be applied to Cohn's technostrategic language and the word "peace". According to Cohn's descriptions, this effect would however work for a different purpose. The word "peace" is not a legitimate part of the vocabulary of a defense intellectual, since people using this word are not taken seriously.[2]

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What are the implications of this linguistic theory (i.e. the effect of thought on language and vice versa) for Carol Cohn's ideas on technostrategic language? To what extent do the thoughts and technostrategic language of defense intellectuals affect each other? Firstly, technostrategic language is doubtlessly a clearer product of its environment than any of the languages typically examined by linguistic research (e.g. Piraha). Was Cohn right in calling technostrategic language a "language", or would we rather define it as a specialised language variant? It lacks characteristics that are usually considered by linguists to be crucial for a language: it is not the only or native tongue of any of its speakers and did not develop over time for basic communication purposes. Instead it was developed by a small elite of scientists and intellectuals and is fully based on English. These first speakers who created the language variant were strongly involved in the development of nuclear arms and, thus, probably fervent proponents. It can be assumed that their explicit aim was to use terms that would let any problem appear less extreme, both to the public and to themselves. In my opinion, the linguistic devices that Cohn identified were, therefore, introduced somewhat purposefully and as a reaction to the environment – and thereby to thought – even if unconsciously. In addition, some concepts, such as that of peace, were not relevant for their language. Peace, which implies the abolition of nuclear arms and deterrence (i.e., the opposite of what defense intellectuals wanted), is not a useful word in that context. Consequently, it may be argued that the development and structure of technostrategic language were in fact determined by thought. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge a possible reverse influence (thought on language) to contribute to a more balanced view of the linguistic debate on Whorfianism.

Let us now briefly contemplate what these findings could mean for other domains. Since 2015, there has been a large influx of migrants and refugees towards Europe, a matter that is commonly described as a "refugee crisis" or "migration crisis" by the media, government

Illustration by: Debora Westra

officials and public figures. How can the use of the word "crisis" be interpreted? On the one hand, one should look at a possible influence of language on thought: What are the implications of using "crisis" in this regard? Drawing on the above research one could speculate that the word conveys a degree of seriousness that more neutral words, such as "issue" or "matter", do not imply. Subsequently, the use of the term "crisis" in this case leads to a more serious perception of the phenomenon, influencing the thoughts of the audience as a result. On the other hand, the reverse influence, that of thought on language, should also be considered: How did thought contribute to the common use of the word "crisis"? From this angle, perhaps the dominant feeling regarding the matter is mainly one of concern and fear, and thus people started to refer to it as a "crisis" rather than using less biased words. In this scenario thought would be influencing language. It seems most probable that both of these aspects have played a role, rather than being mutually exclusive.



Conclusion

Cohn argued that technostrategic language determines its speakers' thoughts. Cohn does not specify what the influence she talks about entails, and her claim that the technostrategic language variant fully determines thought goes too far, as there is no evidence of a fully deterministic relationship. In short, it would therefore be better to argue that technostrategic language does not *determine* thought, but that it can *affect* it. A reverse effect, the influence of speakers' thoughts on their language use, also suggests that environment played an influencing role in the way the technostrategic language of defense intellectuals developed. These reciprocal influences of language and thought are not restricted to the technostrategic language of defense intellectuals as was shown above, but can be observed in other areas, such as the media. The discourse surrounding the "refugee crisis" in Europe is a current example and it would be of interest to further explore it in future in-depth research.

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Field of study
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAWS

Discipline
LAW, SUSTAINABILITY

WE ARE TOO MANY: THE MOST-IGNORED METHOD OF SELF-DESTRUCTION AND HOW LEGISLATION CAN STOP US

It is difficult to imagine a number with ten zeroes.[1] Such a number feels intangible, vast, no matter in which unit it is measured. Even harder to imagine is that the human species might accumulate to such a great number of people, possibly more. Indeed, 7,3 billion individuals [2] currently live together on Earth. Essential to each of us are fundamental rights, such as the right to life,[3] a minimum standard of living,[4] and access to safe water.[5]

> *"If we discovered tomorrow that there was an asteroid on a collision course with earth [...] and we knew that its impact was going to wipe out 70 percent of all life on Earth, governments worldwide would marshal the entire planet into unprecedented action. [...] We are in almost precisely that situation now, except that there isn't [...] an asteroid. The problem is us."*
>
> - Stephen Emmott | Ten Billion

Stephen Emmott is Director of Computational Science at Microsoft, Head of Microsoft's Computational Science Laboratory, in Cambridge, UK, visiting Professor of Biological Computation at University College, London, and a distinguished Fellow of The National Endowment for Science, Technology & the Arts. He is the author of the best-selling book Ten Billion, which elaborates on the causes of overpopulation and its intrinsic and inevitable consequences on the existence of mankind. While some parts of the book have proven controversial, it contributes to draw attention to one of the true origins of climate change: a growing population.[1]

The world's population is ever increasing.[2] Less catastrophic wars, improved nutrition, sanitation and healthcare and a lack of knowledge about contraception in some parts of the world has led to a phenomenon called "overpopulation". This term can be defined as 'the condition of having more people than can live on the earth in comfort, happiness and health and still leave the world a fit place for future generations'.[6] Most people tend to forget, or ignore, that overpopulation constitutes one of the primary causes of environmental damage and climate change.[7] Nevertheless, overpopulation has several consequences, on both mankind and the planet, the responsibility for which lies in humanity's hands. Emmott's quotation paints a daunting picture for our society's future on this planet. While some may prefer to disavow this, it does display what scientific research has shown: mankind has exponentially procreated beyond the planet's natural capacity to provide for it.[8] The more people live on this planet, the more their quality of life will decrease; poverty will soar, food and water will become scarce. At the same time, the more people live on this planet, the more climate change will accelerate and, in addition, the less sustainable life will become. In light of the aforementioned, this article aims to provide an insight into the effects of overpopulation on sustainability, and how, or rather whether, legal rules attempt to curtail overpopulation.

Better living conditions

Overpopulation has several causes, most of which find their origin in the Industrial Revolution post World War II. The developments during this Industrial Revolution not only increased wealth but also led to a decrease in death rates. Modern technologies, such as seeds, fertilisers, pesticides and sophisticated machinery have led to a rapid expansion of agricultural production and distribution.[9] Scientists were able to discover ways to prevent and cure diseases. Advances in medical technology, awareness for nutrition, better public health practices, and progressive developments of vaccinations and medicines improved public health.[9] Moreover, spreading education has contributed to a higher standard of living. Consequently, death rates were falling and were predicted to continue doing so, while the global population was predicted to continue growing.[10] An uncontrolled growth in population is particularly expected in less-developed countries,[10] presumably influenced by religious beliefs, lack of education about contraception and access to it.

In the 40 years following 1950, the world population has doubled from 2.5 billion to 5 billion people.[10] Although the growth rate has slowed down, it remains "alarming" in the words of M. Keenan at a rate of 1.3 percent per year.[10] Breaking down the growth rate to tangible figures, this means that in 2010, "with 140 million registered births, 4.45 infants were born every second of every day".[10] According to census data, the world population will have reached a number of 12 billion people by 2100.[10]

Infants born worldwide in 2010 **140,000,000**



= 100,000

384,000 every day



= 1,000

Adopted from Keenan, 2013

The ecological impact of overpopulation on the planet

Rapid population growth will strain the planet's natural resources to the extent that humanity will not be able to sustainably live on it.[8] The Brundtland Report of 1987 defined sustainability as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs".[11] The current number of individuals living on the planet, however, demands for more resources than the planet is capable of providing.[12] For instance, even though water is commonly taken for granted, and perceived as perpetually renewable, hundreds of millions of people worldwide cannot access safe water.[10] If the current consumption were to continue, this resource, crucial to the survival of mankind, is likely to be exhausted by 2050, a year in which most of the readers of this article will still be alive.[10] Furthermore, overpopulation will impact pollution, thereby increase global warming, and cause, among other things, deterioration of fishing stock, timber, and arable soil.[8] At the same time, overpopulation will trigger migration and provoke ethnic and religious conflicts.[8]



According to J. A. Cassils, "overpopulation is the prime reason that sustainable development remains beyond reach".[8] If the human population continues to increase and life at high standards is being maintained, higher numbers of fundamental resources and raw materials will be required.[13] For instance, coal is expected to last only for a further 50 to 100 years, and would then need to be substituted for oil and gas, which would also have negative effects on the environment.[13]
The dense population of urban areas will pose an "ideal breeding ground for new and old diseases", which, due to migration and tourism, will spread to the rest of the world.[8] It has to be emphasised that the majority of population increase will occur in less developed countries, which are hardly able to meet the needs of present generations, let alone future generations.[8] Therefore, less developed countries will suffer most. Even more so, overpopulation can trigger both deforestation and desertification, hence worsening the ecological substance of the lives of their citizenry.[8,14]

Curtailing overpopulation through laws, action and education

To counter the increase in population growth and thereby to aim for 'sustainable growth', it can be argued that at least three elements are of crucial importance: education, action and laws. Firstly, education may be seen as the key to solving problems related to overpopulation. If more people knew about the consequences of overpopulation on sustainability, methods of contraception, and alternative ways to secure income during retirement, fertility rates might decrease, particularly in less developed countries. The latter aspect implies eradicating poverty, which links to the proposal of taking action as a second step. Thomas Pogge considers eradicating poverty as "one of the most effective things [...] to control population growth", as he sees the reason for population growth in less developed countries in the people's belief that offspring will provide for parents once they reach an old age.[15]

Another proposal for taking action comes from D. Pimentel, who urges society, especially in developed countries, to "actively conserve cropland, freshwater, energy, and other basic environmental resources".[13] He argues that this way the growing difference between the numbers of human beings and essential resources may be halted.[13] More importantly

however, mankind would need to take action by adapting to a new set of values, both economically and morally. Travel and consumer habits demand for ever higher production levels and thus for a perpetual supply of resources. The wealthy West's ecological footprint keeps growing and growing, thereby more than exceeding the proportional right on space, air, water and natural resources that mankind has.[16] Imagining the rest of the world to adapt to Western society's standard leads one to conclude that, next to the planet's suffering, one would even require two more earth globes to meet such standards.[16]

As a third step, one would need laws to contain overpopulation, norms that are generally binding and enforceable once being infringed upon. According to the UN World Population Policy Report 2013, many governments worldwide have realised the importance of containing world population growth so as to attain sustainability and combat climate change.[17] One of the earliest outcomes of international discussions on the topic is the UN's Report of the International Conference on Population and Development drafted in Cairo in 1994. It holds that "population issues should be integrated into [...] programmes relating to sustainable development" at all levels of governmental actions.[18] However, if one looks at the substance of the Plan of Action with regards to Chapter III 'Interrelationships between Population, Sustained Economic Growth, and Sustainable Development', specifically part C 'Population and Environment', the Plan of Action merely recognises that "pressure on the environment may result from rapid population growth."[18] The Plan of Action determines that "governments [...] should formulate and implement population policies and programmes to support the objectives and actions agreed upon in Agenda 21 [...]."[18,19] It recommends actions such as to "integrate demographic factors into environmental impact assessments [...] aimed at achieving sustainable development", and to "take measures aimed at eradication of poverty [...]."[18] Admittedly, those objectives seem to be rather vague and leave room for states' discretion. How would states integrate demographic factors exactly, and who would assess environmental impact? More importantly, who would ensure that the processes are genuinely aimed at sustainable development, more specifically at environmental improvement, not merely at sustainable economic growth? Furthermore, there is neither an enforcement body nor controlling organ to ensure that those recommendations will eventually be implemented at national level. Even if there were, how would the actions taken by governments be evaluated or measured?

> **"Global sustainability [...] requires a different type of society, (and) a different type of thinking [...]."**

Another example of a law constraining population growth is the one-child-policy that was promoted in China until October 2015. According to this policy, every couple may only have one child. Human rights advocates criticised this model regarding the right of every woman to "determine herself how many children she bears".[8] In 2009, at the Climate Change summit in Copenhagen, China proudly advertised its model, claiming its policy has resulted in 400 million fewer births,[20] with some calling for such a one-child policy to be adopted worldwide.[21] Even if governments were to do so, the world population would still increase before stabilising at about 13 billion people.[13]

A different kind of society is required

After stating the facts in the previous paragraphs, answering the question whether legal rules attempt to curtail overpopulation should be an easy task. Given the urgent environmental situation, drastic and imminent actions are required. Considering the vagueness of legal terms, however, said urgency could not be met by policies or regulations. According to Albert Bartlett, compromises would not provide the solution because they are capable of only reducing the extent of environmental damage [22] rather than securing sustainability for future generations. Thus, overpopulation needs to be substantially reduced.[13] This calls for either a drastic reduction in the number of human living on this planet, or an imminent setback to earlier, less-developed, or less-progressed times. Cassils argues that reducing the human population to, for instance, two billion people would immensely improve everyone's quality of life, having all technological advantages, while environmental deterioration would be contained.[8]

The option of reducing the number of humans living on Earth dramatically must be dismissed for moral reasons at once. While wars were liable to have the most destructive impact on population numbers in the past, today at least societies in the Western hemisphere live in comparably more peaceful times.[23] Moreover, one might also safely assume that no current government is likely to launch a nuclear or biological attack to diminish a large part of the human population in order to save the environment, even more so when keeping in mind that a nuclear attack would also have a devastating effect on the environment as such.

In order to achieve a setback to less-developed times, wealthy, developed societies would have to stop at once all activities that both harm the environment and lead to climate change: no productions, no cars, no flights, no emissions, no plastic bottles, no capsule coffee, etcetera. This would constitute a deterioration of almost everyone's quality of life in the developed parts of the world, and hence would certainly require several attempts of convincing and persuading to adapt.

Given the likelihood of both remedies to fail, there is nothing else to add other than to sum up that, as Wim Couwenberg phrased it, "global sustainability [...] requires a different type of society, [and] a different type of thinking [...]".[12] Otherwise, "the finite size of resources, ecosystems, the environment, and the Earth [will] lead one to recognize that the term "sustainable growth" is an oxymoron.".[22]

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Field of study
SOCIAL AND HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY

Discipline
COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

IS RELIGIOUS BELIEF A DELIBERATE CHOICE?

Religious faith is commonly seen as the result of deliberate and conscious choice, and this notion is often reflected in the manner in which individuals speak about such beliefs.[1, 2] For example, by stating that individuals accept one belief, or reject another, it is implied that human beings consciously select whether or not to hold religious beliefs.[2] One consequence of this notion is that it allows individuals to be held responsible for their beliefs, and this responsibility can, in turn, justify differential treatment towards believers and disbelievers – those who question religious claims. If, on the other hand, belief is seen as caused by factors that are not consciously controlled, then one's beliefs do not warrant differential treatment. In fact, one of the best examples of differential treatment of believers and disbelievers - the doctrine of hell – is partially undermined if individuals cannot be held responsible for 'rejecting' the correct deity.

This article will not attempt to argue that conscious mental processes have no effect on religious beliefs, as it is possible that conscious choice is an important factor impacting belief or unbelief. Rather, it will present evidence that suggests that situational factors and unconscious mental processes also exert a sizable influence on religious beliefs. We should not dismiss these aspects of the psychological underpinnings of faith, and situational factors and unconscious processes can provide a useful explanation for the prevalence of religious beliefs. If the arguments outlined throughout this article are accepted, then it follows that the notion of deliberate and conscious choice as the only factor responsible for religious beliefs should be discarded.

Two processes

Human behavior is theorized to be driven by two distinguishable mental processes, which are often named systems 1 and 2.[3] System 1 is fast, automatic, unconscious, and its output is experienced as a gut feeling, or intuition.[3] In contrast, system 2 is slow, effortful, verbal, deliberative, and works through consciousness.[3] Therefore, its output can be seen as representing a conscious deliberation – such as Pascal's famous notion of a **calculated wager**. If religious beliefs result only from conscious deliberation, then they should rely upon system 2.

Pascal's Wager: "Granted that faith cannot be proved, what harm will come to you if you gamble on its truth and it proves false? If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation, that He exists." [1]

Various studies suggest that cognitive style – the tendency to preferentially rely on one of the two systems – has a role in religious beliefs. In one such study, analytic thinking style, a function of system 2, was shown to be associated with lower self-reported religiosity.[4] One's cognitive style can be assessed using three questions [5]: "A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?", "If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?", and "In a lake there is a patch of lily pads. Every day the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?" These questions are designed to evoke an **intuitively appealing – yet wrong – answer** at first. Further deliberation is required in order to overrule early intuitions and to find the correct, analytic answer.[4, 5] In addition to being less religious, individuals who provide more analytic answers tend to do better on tests of cognitive ability and academic achievement, and avoid common mistakes in decision making.[5, 6]

A **common mistake** for 1: The ball costs 1 dollar, correct answer: the ball costs 0,05 dollar. For 2: the common mistake is 100 minutes, correct answer: 5 minutes. For 3: the common mistake is 24 days, correct answer: 47 days.

While intriguing, the aforementioned correlation does not imply causation, as it cannot suggest which factor causes change in the other, nor does it completely rule out the possibility that unaccounted-for variables, such as genetic predispositions, affect both faith and thinking style. Religious beliefs tend to be bolstered by system 1 and hindered by system 2.[7] Nevertheless, it is both possible and plausible that there are other factors at play. In order to draw conclusions regarding causality, **randomised controlled experiments** are required. But, showing that A is causally related to B does not conclude a scientific endeavor.

Randomised controlled experiments are often considered as the best evidence for causality. Two key features of these experiments are 1) Randomisation: participants are randomly assigned to different groups in order to minimize and control pre-experimental differences between groups, and 2) Control: participants are divided into groups that are assumed to differ only with regard to the specific treatments to which they are either exposed at different levels (experimental groups) or not at all (control groups).

A series of randomised controlled experiments provides insight on the hypothesis that system 1 is related to religious belief, while system 2 is related to skepticism towards such beliefs. In one experiment, the promotion of intuitive thinking style, a function of system 1, led to an increase in reported religiosity, as measured by a questionnaire.[8] Intuitive thinking style was encouraged by asking participants to either write about an occasion in which an intuition led to positive outcomes, or to write about a time in which careful reasoning failed them.[8] An especially striking result of a related experiment was that 65 percent of the participants who

> *"Having participants read a text written in small font can have a greater impact on religious beliefs than refuting arguments and evidence; hardly the hallmark of a deliberate and calculated choice."*

described a successful intuition reported having an experience that had convinced them of the existence of God, while only 45 percent of participants who were asked to describe a successful deliberation reported such a divine experience.[8] Note that it is highly unlikely that this difference existed before the experiment, as participants (N = 373) were randomly allocated to one of four writing groups. One might speculate that the difference was due to negative versus positive wording. However, this would be incorrect, since the experiment had participants write about successful deliberations and failed intuitions, which allowed the researchers to rule out an effect of the valence of wording. While this study could not conclusively support the notion that system 2 is causally related to religious disbelief, another study showed that the bolstering of analytic thinking tends to lead to a decrease in self-reported religiosity (long term effects were not tested), as measured by a variety of questionnaires.[9] This was done using methods previously shown to induce analytic thinking, such as exposing groups of participants to a picture of Auguste Rodin's The Thinker before asking them about their beliefs, and by asking groups of participants to rate their religiosity on questionnaires written in a difficult-to-read font.[9] It is interesting to note that secular arguments seem to have no effect on the reported beliefs of religious individuals – at least not in controlled settings,[7, 10] while simple manipulations of participants' thinking style are capable of influencing reported beliefs. Having participants read a text written in small font seems to have a greater impact on reported religiosity than refuting arguments and evidence [7-10]; hardly the hallmark of a deliberate and calculated choice.

While valuable for theorising, the real-life implications of the aforementioned studies should not be overestimated. Although thinking style seems to have a role in faith, it only explains a small part of the complex phenomena that is religious belief. Nevertheless, the aforementioned studies establish that unconscious processes impact religious beliefs, and provide the dual process framework with a basis for the study of faith. Now that the connection between religious beliefs and the two systems has been established, it is possible to use the dual process framework to try to understand how a variety of factors influence faith.

Religious beliefs in times of crisis

Death and mortality have important and intriguing roles in religious beliefs.[10, 11] In one exceptional study from New Zealand, during which participants' religious beliefs were repeatedly measured over time, a deadly earthquake affected the population of Christchurch and its surroundings.[12] The results of this study showed that communities that were impacted by the earthquake, on average, became more religious, while religiosity decreased in the general, unaffected population.[12] How can this be explained? The dual process framework may help - a series of controlled experiments, imposing concerns regarding death had a number of intriguing consequences. On average, both religious and non-religious participants became more confident in their previous world-views, as measured using verbal self-reports.[10] However, self-reports, which are considered to represent the verbal system 2, were not the only measurement taken. Implicit measurements, which are considered to represent the automatic system 1, were taken from separate samples. Implicit representations of religious beliefs were conceptualised as the time it takes to categorise religious themes as real or imaginary.[10]



One way in which implicit religiosity can be measured is by asking participants to indicate whether God is real or imaginary, and measuring how much time they require before providing an answer.[10] For a nonbeliever, the longer it takes to indicate that God is imaginary, the higher the implicit religiosity; while for a believer, faster indications of the reality of God imply a higher implicit religiosity.[10] The results of the second experiment suggest that inducing thoughts regarding death tends to increase implicit religiosity for both religious and non-religious participants,[10] as atheists took longer to indicate that they don't believe, while theists quickly answered that they do believe. Taken together, these experiments show that concerns regarding death have distinct consequences for systems 1 and 2: The effect on system 1 seems to be favorable towards religion, whereas the effect on system 2 strengthens previously held beliefs. Following the earthquake in Christchurch, a general increase in religiosity was observed. Therefore, only the change in system 1 is compatible with the religious aftermath of the Christchurch earthquake.

Death and suffering are inexorably related to faith.[11-13] This association can be explained in various ways, and probably includes many different layers. One possible aspect of this relationship is that, for yet unknown reasons, death and suffering alter the way in which system 1 represents religious beliefs. This influence might, when chronic, lead to an enduring shift in religious beliefs. Based on the evidence and theory that were presented, one might predict that members of safe societies in which analytic (system 2) thinking is encouraged tend to be particularly skeptical towards religious beliefs. This prediction is empirically supported.[13-15]

Illustration by: Saskia van der Post

Conclusion

Throughout this paper, it was shown that external (originating outside of the person) factors, such as the salience of death and the promotion of cognitive styles, could influence religious beliefs. In addition, empirical evidence was used to argue that internal (originating within the person) unconscious processes also play a role in faith. Therefore, religious beliefs are not determined solely by deliberative processes. One might point out that unconscious processes and situational factors are considered to impact most aspects of human life,[3, 16] yet people are legally and ethically considered to be responsible for their actions. In that case, why can an individual be held accountable for driving over the speed limit, and not for believing or disbelieving in religious claims? One answer is that religious belief is not a simple and brief action in which conscious will seems to dictate behavior.[2] Faith is a prolonged and complex process that depends on factors such as deliberation, intuition, safety, and education, and there is no reason to recognise only one of these aspects as the main mechanism underlying religious belief.[2]

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Interview with
BRUNO NASSIM ABOUDRAR

Authors
PIOTR G.S. SCHULKES & ROZANNE M. VERSENDAAL

FROM THE MID
CENTRE STAG
JOURNEY FRO
CLOTHING TO
SYMBOL

ODLE EAST TO E: THE VEIL'S M A PIECE OF A RELIGIOUS

Bruno Nassim Aboudrar is professor of aesthetics and theories of art at *Université Sorbonne Nouvelle (Paris 3)* in Paris, France. His main interests are the questions surrounding the Islamic veil and other face-covering garments in France and Europe. In 2014 he wrote *Comment le voile est devenu Musulman* ('How the veil became Muslim'),[1] a book that discusses the history of the veil and facial concealment from Antiquity to the present day.

You are a professor of aesthetics and theories of art at *Université Sorbonne Nouvelle (Paris III)*. This sounds quite arcane; what *are* aesthetics, in your opinion?

In practice, aesthetics aims to understand what a piece of art shows, and how it does so. Furthermore, it tries to convey what the message of the piece is, and finally, what role the artwork has in society. Basically, aesthetics looks at all the questions related to a piece of art, and the presence of certain symbols, such as the veil.

Aesthetics is the branch of philosophy that deals with questions of beauty and artistic taste.[2]

> *"By subscribing to the established tradition of covering themselves, effectively hiding themselves from society, Muslim women highlight their own presence."*

You exemplify aesthetics to others through your research on the Islamic veil and on the question how the veil became a Muslim symbol. Why does this topic in particular have your interest?

The question of the veil interests me because it is based on a paradox. Muslim women can be identified as Muslim due to the fact that they cover themselves up. The paradox here is that by subscribing to the established tradition of covering themselves, effectively hiding themselves from society, they highlight their own presence.
The veil, interestingly, has become a symbol of Islam, which is an icon-less religion. Parallel to the veil's rise as a religious symbol, two main discourses have appeared. On one hand there is the West, who does not support the veil as it is considered incompatible with its values of secularism and transparency. On the other hand there are the women who decide to wear the veil, either for primarily religious reasons or for reasons of identity.

Illustration by: Saskia van der Post

This paradox is also mentioned in your book, *How the veil became Muslim*. There you explain that the veil became an icon for Muslims and Islam, while this fundamentally contrasts with the nature of the Islamic religion. Can you further expand on this?

In theory, [Sunni] Islam is a religion which avoids imagery. A religion that does not allow images is what we call an aniconic religion. This is contrary to Catholicism, for example, where churches are filled with paintings of the crucifixion and sculptures of saints and the Virgin Mary. Islam, on the other hand, has recurring signs and symbols, but no images. Islam is a religion that rejects images of sentient beings, including humans and the Prophet Muhammad. However, the veil, which is of course worn by women, has become an image of Islam.

Aniconism is the prohibition of images in a religious cult and its practices. Such opposition is particularly relevant to the Jewish, Islamic, and Byzantine artistic traditions.[3] Sunni Islam is the branch of Islam followed by about 70% of Muslims. Unlike the Shia branch who wanted the line of succession to stay within the Prophet Muhammad's family, the Sunnis believed the new Caliph should be chosen based on consensus.[4]

> *"The first religion that gave the veil a religious connotation was Christianity. Interestingly, the veil has become a symbol of Islam, which is an icon-less religion."*

The title of your book, *How the veil became Muslim*, seems to suggest that the veil has not always been an integral part of Islam. What are the historical origins of the veil and what does the Quran say about the question of the veil?

The veil existed as a piece of clothing long before any religious value had been attributed to it. Furthermore, while it is not exactly common knowledge, the first religion that gave the veil a religious connotation was Christianity, doing so in the first chapter of Corinthians of Saint Paul. It discusses the veil for women during prayer, where the women need to cover themselves to attend service. It is a sign of submission to the man, following the order of creation and the hierarchy wanted by God. First, the highest, God himself, then Adam, followed by Eve. The veil aimed to express this natural order.

1 Corinthians 11: 5-6 (English Revised Version): 'But every woman praying or prophesying with her head unveiled dishonoureth her head: for it is one and the same thing as if she were shaven. For if a woman is not veiled, let her also be shorn: but if it is a shame to a woman to be shorn or shaven, let her be veiled.'

In the Quran, the only verse in which the veil is mentioned is **Sura 33, verse 59.** Here, it discusses covering only the head of women, not even their face. In the verse it is written that the veil ensures women can be distinguished and respected. The veil meant that they could be recognized as free women, not slaves, and that the women could be distinguished from non-Muslims. It is not a creed purely based on religious grounds, but also on social grounds.

Sura 33: Verse 59 (Sahih International Version): 'O Prophet, tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to bring down over themselves [part] of their outer garments. That is more suitable that they will be known and not be abused.'

Regarding the fact that this interview will be published in *Honours Review*, a magazine published in the Netherlands, can you briefly summarize the current situation and debate on the Islamic veil in France?

France is a 'secular'(*laïc*) country. The French ideal of *laïcité* states that political and religious power should be separated and the state should remain impartial. *Laïcité* aims to ensure that all people are equal in the eyes of the law, regardless of origin or religion. The state guarantees that you can have a religion, but also that it cannot be exercised in public. Therefore, overt signs of religious following are prohibited in public spaces. So, on one hand you have a law calling for religious freedom, although not necessarily in public. On the other hand, you have certain groups, among them feminists, who believe the veil, with its symbol of submission to a man, limits the freedom of women and consider it humiliating. There are also [political] factions who feel the veil challenges western values and symbolizes something that does not belong in a western society.

And which approach to the problem of the veil do you propose in your book?

My approach is one of representation, as both feminists and the *laïcité*-supporters have qualms about the connotations of the veil. The question of the veil in Europe is a problem of visibility; it has become a means through which Muslim females distinguish themselves, linking back to the aforementioned paradox of the veil. In our western society, nothing illustrates the Islamic society better than these veiled women. Especially in western visual media, the veil has become a rallying point for several ideologies and debates, ranging from religious freedom, secularism and feminism.

During the decay of the Ottoman Empire, the French seized Algiers in 1830. This heralded the start of the French colonization of North Africa, where the French imperial policy was to exploit the resources in the region. France's domestic and foreign policy towards the country sowed the seeds of division between the Muslims and the non-Muslims, which is still plaguing the French society. Concerning the question of the veil, the French main colonizer of Algeria said: "*Les Arabes nous échappent, parce qu'ils dissimulent leurs femmes à nos regards*" ('The Arabs elude us, because they hide their women from our eyes'), which already reflects a fierce 19th-century misunderstanding of the question of the veil.[5]

You are particularly interested in the historical period of the colonization of North Africa (1830s – 1960s). Why is this such an interesting period for the question of the veil?

When the French colonists arrived in the Maghreb, they saw the veil as something peculiar; as a sign of resistance against the occupying power; something outside of their control. Of course, it was only a human custom, instead of a political act of resistance. This perceived resistance caused tensions between the colonists and the native population. As a consequence, we can notice that in the 19th century there was a fixation on the veiled women by the colonists, who imagined what the women would look like without the veil. These thoughts were reflected and realized in paintings and literature from the colonial period. Since then, it has had a unique place in the public consciousness.

In the Netherlands, the question of the veil will be an important issue for the national elections in 2017. According to some politicians, the veil is a danger and a risk, for example for security reasons, but also for national values. Do these aspects, security and national values, also play a role in the French debate?

Yes of course, they are both very important elements. In France you see the extreme right party, the *Front National*, take a very belligerent position in regards to the veil: they believe the veil is dangerous, and I know there is such an extreme political party in the Netherlands too. A part of the population has an extreme fear for the influences of Islam and believe the veil is threatening. Nevertheless, you see a difference between the two countries, as the Netherlands has a history of tolerance. This was caused in part by the Netherlands being a republic during its golden era, when acceptance of different beliefs and cultures benefited the Dutch due to their trade with people from all over the world. This is different from France, in which the kings of the *Ancien Regime* and the church were less open to other cultures and religions, as this threatened the unity in the kingdom.

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Final question: how would you like your research to contribute to the current debate on the veil in France and to a better understanding of this issue?

It is difficult to respond to this question. I am not part of the on-going contemporary debate. My research focuses on the history of the veil, not how it affects society today, although there is always some overlap. I try to remain outside the debate, not fully involved. I only position myself on the margins.

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Field of study
PSYCHOLOGY

Discipline
OPENNESS, TRANSPARENCY, SCIENTIFIC CONDUCT

OPEN SCIENCE: A SHIFT AWAY FROM STANDARD PRACTICES

As a scientist, you are expected to be *open* and *transparent* about the way you practice research.[1] These core values of the scientific enterprise have not changed over the last decades. However, some things have changed. Present-day scientists have excellent tools at their disposal to adhere to these values in a systematic manner as a result of technological improvements. For example, a present-day scientist can, quite literally, with a click of a button, share research data, analyses scripts, and any other relevant study materials. In contrast, scientists of previous eras had to hassle with physical papers to share their work, which usually meant that journals could keep record of only the actual paper rather than of the whole research process.[2]



> *"In an ideal scientific world, we are not only open about our research practices, but also about every other aspect of science."*

The importance of openness

Formally put, science is an overarching system that studies nature in a collaborative fashion through scientific discovery. Painting an ideal science is difficult since it is a continuously developing enterprise which faces many challenges.[3] In an ideal scientific world, we are not only open with our research practices, but also with every other aspect of science. "No one scientist or scientific body is the arbiter of truth" [4] – we are more likely to discover the truth by remaining open and transparent.

Openness and transparency are considered to be core values of science,[1] values which support science's objectives of building a shared body of knowledge and supporting the systematic search for knowledge whose validity does not depend on the particular individual but is open for anyone to check or rediscover.[5] Science is so tightly woven into Western societies that it is almost impossible to imagine a life without it – it has become part of our modern secular world. Indeed, common sense is usually accompanied by scientific knowledge and it seems as if there is a general consensus about science being open, objective, and trusted unconditionally. Not only is there a lack of public questioning of scientific work and does science receive high scores for trust, but most people also have the view that science has led us to a better world in terms of welfare, health, and freedom.[6,7] However, this view should also be nuanced. As the Rathenau Instituut emphasises in their recent reports on trust in science, "science comes under pressure once scientific insights threaten to affect daily life and are given concrete form. As soon as scientists become involved in government policymaking or take commercial assignments then trust in them falls".[8;3]

The **Rathenau Instituut**, an organisation formed by the Dutch government in 1978, "promotes the formation of political and public opinion on science and technology". To achieve this, the Institute studies among others the organisation and development of science systems. Moreover, the institute publishes about social impact of new technologies, and organises debates on issues and dilemmas in science and technology.

Technological developments gave scientists exceptional means by which they could study the human psyche and, thanks to those dedicated scientists, we have made mountainous leaps in our understanding of humans. Indeed, improved technologies, such as more powerful computers and better-equipped laboratories, largely helped scientists work more efficiently, handle more data, and share their work. The driving force of science's progress, however, is not only the result of improved technologies, but also of scientists working together and deliberating over each other's work. No scientist would deny that science progresses through open debates and the exchange of thoughts and results. These are the most efficient ways of discovering the truth about nature and can be the source of an 'eureka' moment.

If the contemporary scientist chose to adhere to the values of openness and transparency, it would be beneficial for science: It would facilitate replication efforts and large scale meta-analyses in the natural sciences, and it would stimulate sharing large repositories of texts in the humanities. Replication studies can be more easily conducted when scientists have a clear understanding of the original methods and materials, and science would gain much more

Illustration by: Debora Westra

clarity if scientists were open about their methods, analyses, and data. Moreover, in transparent and open science, all results, rather than only those that show statistical significance, can be accessed and discussed among scientists. The values of openness and transparency are closely related to each other: If a scientist makes data and procedures openly and freely available, this leads to more transparency.

The contents of this article proved controversial: 'science', 'openness' and 'transparency' are terms that need to be defined clearly. The current article does not follow the normative understanding of science in the line of Karl Popper: As science as a means to explain how nature works, which is not necessarily the discovery of truth. A subtle but important difference the reader might want to reflect on.

It remains a challenge for scientists to align their day-to-day practice with the core values of science. Although scientific norms (rules which describe appropriate behaviour within science), such as openly sharing data, being transparent about research procedures, and replicating studies for independent verification, are readily accepted by most scientists,[9] increasing evidence suggests that adhering to these norms is not part of scientists' daily routines.[10] Moreover, in a recent study on data-sharing, Vanpaemel et al. found that the availability of psychological research data is still far away from an open science ideal.[11] After requesting data of 394 psychology papers, only approximately one third of the approached authors shared their data. Although scientists shared their data more often than an earlier estimation suggested,[12] this is still an alarmingly low rate. Why, then, do we not yet have an open and transparent culture within science despite its clear benefits?

It hinges on the academic rewards system

One popular answer to the question of why science is not yet open and transparent is: 'Because of the academic reward system.' Scientists are often rewarded for the funding they attract, the amount of studies they publish, the amount of citations they receive, and the sexiness (i.e., novelty and counter intuitiveness) of their research. Currently, journals have the tendency to favour publishing studies that have statistically significant results as opposed to studies that do not.[13] This is especially true for the domains of psychology and psychiatry.[14] For science, both significant and non-significant results are of equal value – but this is often not the case for the individual scientist. For example, it is equally valuable to know that some quirks of the human mind (e.g., memory) differ between some groups of people (e.g., young and older people) but not others (e.g., males and females). Alas, a lack of significant results can lead to a career of short durance since non-significant studies are less likely to be published, and publishing is vital to an academic career. Thus the current system leads to a loss of interesting results which are often 'filed into a drawer,' never to be accessed again.

In other words, scientists are rewarded for personal achievements. As a consequence, scientists tend to neglect the core values of science, including openness, transparency, and reproducibility, in order to gain a personal advantage. For example, scientists might prefer to keep their data secret rather than openly sharing them to protect themselves.[2] Scientists are rewarded personally for discovering something, so why would they share their data if someone else could beat them to it using this shared data? [15]

Science, however, does not care about *who* discovers what, but about finding the truth in an efficient way – it cares about the *what*. If our goal in science is to discover the truth, then there are clear benefits to endorsing open scientific practices. Open practices not only have the potential to smoothen collaboration, but also to grease the wheels of up-and-coming research practices, such as large scale meta-analyses and reproducibility projects.[16] Taken together, the culture within science seems to rely on a contradiction between its ideal framework that is built around collaboration and its tendency to reward egoism.[4] Scientists are expected to navigate in a web of multiple, contradictory incentives. This begs the question: Is there a way to a culture of openness in science?

The path to openness

There are many ways of creating conditions that help openness flourish because science consists of several layers of hierarchical orders. Firstly, there are the higher-order systems (e.g., top-down), such as the journals, universities, and politics (http://www.openaccess.nl/en). Secondly, there are lower-order systems (e.g., bottom-up), which constitute the contribution of individual scientists.
Two scholars in particular – Daniel Lakens and Felix Schönbrodt – have written about what individual scientists can do to support open science (see http://daniellakens.blogspot.nl/ and http://www.nicebread.de/). Their suggestions boil down to a few things. Firstly, scientists need to be aware of what openness as a core value of science signifies, why more openness is necessary, and where in the research process openness is missing. Scientists also need to be aware of why openness is beneficial for the individual scientist, science, and societies, and who deserves to have open access to scientists' work (e.g., do we provide open access to people who pay taxes, which are being used for funding of research projects?). Secondly, an important step for individual scientists is to organise their research related materials and to make use of existing initiatives that facilitate open scientific practices, such as the Center for Open Science (COS; see, https://cos.io/). Thirdly, scientists today can already openly share their preprints. Fourthly, scientists need to find the degree of openness they are comfortable with at the beginning because we cannot expect scientists to shift their gears towards openness from one moment to the next. Fifthly, Lakens and Schönbrodt encourage individuals to get involved with pre-registering. The whole idea of pre-registration is to work more efficiently by applying for a so called 'in-principle acceptance' of the introduction, method, and analysis plan before actually doing the study. Sixthly, when scientists are in a position in which they evaluate the work of others, such as peer-reviewers, they can foster an open culture by encouraging others to publish with open access as a standard practice. Lastly, one of the biggest reasons that scientists currently do not use open scientific practices is because they have never learned them properly. Teaching openness to young academics is, therefore, crucial.

Conclusion

Open access has the potential to polish the window through which the workings of human nature are observed. Science is a collaborative enterprise, and it is important to remind ourselves of scientific values, especially openness and transparency. The Dutch government even has this as a policy instrument in order to have "maximum impact in society and industry".[8] However, the current academic system predominantly rewards individual accomplishments as opposed to open debates. This has the inevitable consequence of fuelling egotistical tendencies, such as striving for a great quantity of publications and citations. But engaging in open scientific practices increases our knowledge as a common good, and various ways of encouraging them exists for larger institutions as well as individual scientists. Indeed, openly exchanging ideas and data is the most useful way of practicing science in the long run – a rising tide lifts all boats.

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Book review of
FRAENKEL, CARLOS. 2015. *TEACHING PLATO IN PALESTINE. PHILOSOPHY IN A*

TEACHING PLA PALESTINE: FR AGREEMENT T IN CONFLICT A

"...Readers can feel like they are real students in Fraenkel's philosophy classroom."

DIVIDED WORLD.

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REAS

Carlos Fraenkel, working in the field of philosophy and religious studies in Oxford and Montreal, is a man on a mission. As a "philosophical adventurer" (1;XIX), Fraenkel travels far from the university's ivory tower, to *do* philosophy instead of only *teaching* it. Why would a respected academic do something like this? In *Teaching Plato in Palestine: Philosophy in a Divided World* (2015), Fraenkel provides insight into this and explains his motives for taking philosophy out of academia and the classroom. Briefly summarised, he thinks that philosophy can be an instrument for the Self to understand the Other. Both terms must be understood in the broadest possible sense. Philosophy can serve as a communication tool in regions of religious and political conflicts, which is in this case not limited to the Middle East, but also includes conflict regions in South America and Asia. *So what* exactly is Fraenkel teaching in those areas? Departing from Plato's *Republic*, which deals with the idea that a good state can exist only if the rulers become philosophers or if philosophers rule, he consistently argues that every democracy on Earth should preferably turn its citizens into philosophers (1;32). Fraenkel has put himself in the vanguard of this mission and immediately approaches a difficult task: teaching Plato in divided Israel. In his book he successively takes us from Israel to Indonesia, New York and finally to Brazil.

"I am trying to find out if one can use philosophy to address real-life concerns and to have debates across cultural boundaries [...]", Fraenkel firmly states. "The clash between modernity and religious tradition, for example, gives rise to fundamental questions. And I want to know if philosophy can help to explore them."(1;54) Philosophy, in this context, must not be regarded as simply teaching material from intellectual thinkers of yore. No, for Fraenkel, philosophy is a practice, and a language that would ideally lead to and give rise to what he calls a "culture of debate". This is a recurring term throughout all of the essays, although the theoretical framework that endorses it is mainly demonstrated in the sixth chapter of the book, after the first five chapters that each present a case study. According to Fraenkel, a culture of debate is based not on the sophistical skill of making one's opinion prevail over others, but on the dialectical skill of engaging in a joint search for the truth.(1;XVI) The joint search that characterises the culture of debate, in which the Socratic debate, dialogue, as well as sustainable arguments and rhetoric are indispensable, takes place in an institutional context, for example in politics, in academia or in religious institutes. Another pillar Fraenkel extensively pleads for is fallibilism: the principle that human beings can be wrong about their beliefs, expectations or their understanding of the world.(1;163) Fallibilism includes therefore a certain degree of tolerance as well. As long as all participants in the culture of debate support this notion, Fraenkel is convinced that his idea of the culture of debate could work.

Especially strong in Fraenkel's work is the way he succeeds in combining academic study material, ancient and modern philosophical viewpoints, and his experiences as a teacher *sur place*. All these elements form a fluent, touching and sometimes humoristic discourse on what it means to *do* philosophy from different eras in various geographical areas. From the 11th-century thinker al-Farabi to the contemporary philosopher Nusseibeh; Fraenkel is able to talk his readers smoothly through the – sometimes – difficult philosophical materials. The readers of *Teaching Plato* feel immediately gripped by their sympathetic teacher and can identify with the students' questions in the dialogues. This could eventually lead to such a level of immersion that readers can feel like they are real students in Fraenkel's philosophy classroom. This interesting aesthetic technique has recently been brilliantly described by the literary scholar Kirsten Hartvigsen as "playing the role of the individual witness" [2;56] and enables readers to process characters inhabiting the narrative world in almost the same manner as they process people in the real world.[2;56-57]

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Illustration by: Debora Westra

However, some critical remarks on *Teaching Plato* are in order: firstly, the book is classified by Fraenkel as an "intellectual travelogue", but this is only partially the case. Yes, Fraenkel takes his readers on an intellectual journey from ancient Greece to southern Spain and the Middle East by resonating the dialogues between him and the students on the ideas of the philosophers of old. However, these conversations have of course not literally taken place. They are rewritten, adapted and subjected to stylistic and literary adjustments, according to what Fraenkel considers important for his story. In *Teaching Plato*, one should therefore realise that the book contains many fictitious elements in order to create a fluent narrative. The terms "philosophical fiction" and "philosophical essay" therefore also come in mind, but one proper genre to define the novel by is extremely difficult.

Secondly, the choice of essays is disappointing, with the title of the book being particularly misleading. The first essay is indeed on teaching in Palestine, however, is teaching Plato in this area really different from teaching Plato in Europe or the States? The reader gets the impression that this is not the case. Students are students. Philosophy is still in his classroom, and not outside of it, which was one of Fraenkel's goals as defined in the preface. The second essay, which deals with students in Indonesia, is interesting, while numbers three to five are below this standard (although philosophy is taken more "out of the classroom" in these essays than in the first two). Readers will therefore have lost their concentration and interest before they will enter the theoretical essay in chapter six, in which the culture of debate is further explained.

The final, theoretical chapter of the book also has its foibles. Although the culture of debate is an indispensable element that binds the five case studies and the sixth chapter, there is also a distinct lack of coherence between them. In the sixth chapter the reader is left without guidance or concrete examples, and instead has to understand Fraenkel's theory on his own. The majority of readers will therefore regrettably drop out of Fraenkel's "class".

In conclusion, *Teaching Plato in Palestine* is an exceptionally brave attempt by Carlos Fraenkel to reach out to regions in our world that are in serious conflict. This is a noble cause, and Fraenkel presents himself almost as a missionary in the sacral sense of the word who believes in the healing powers of philosophy. His book is an inspiring reflection of his experiences and engagements, as well as a prudent orientation and exploration of what philosophy could mean for people living in conflict regions. Fraenkel should definitely be praised for his courage, although the structure and transitions in his work unfortunately leave some things to be desired.

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THE WOOLFS AND WOMEN'S WRITING: FEMINIST PUBLICATIONS AT THE HOGARTH PRESS

Virginia Woolf (1882 – 1941) is widely remembered and celebrated as a feminist icon, mostly for her essay *A Room of One's Own* (1929).[1] In this work, she explores how the talent of women writers has been suppressed throughout history due to a continuous lack of opportunity, money and freedom. She attacks this issue in a manner radical for its time, making it a key text in women's studies today.[2] Woolf was able to provide such open commentary on gender relations because she was free from the restrictions of editorship. Together with her husband Leonard Woolf (1880-1969), she founded the Hogarth Press in 1917, which allowed her to print and publish on her own accord. She realised this put her in a special position, as she in her diary proclaimed herself 'the only woman free in England to write what she liked'.[3]

Illustration by: Saskia van der Post

In addition to Virginia Woolf's most famous feminist texts such as *A Room of One's Own* and *Three Guineas* (1938), other feminist works written by British suffragettes appeared at the Woolfs' private press. This article will discuss three of the most prominent examples hereof, namely the pamphlet *Leisured Women* (1928), the collection of memoirs *Life as We Have Known It* (1931), and the compilation *Our Freedom and Its Results* (1936). Using these case studies, this article will investigate the ways in which the Hogarth Press engaged with feminist politics, and the roles Virginia and Leonard Woolf played in the publication processes of these feminist works. It will argue that Virginia Woolf espoused a markedly limited notion of feminism, to which her disengaged attitude towards the publication of these three feminist works at the Hogarth Press testifies, and will show that Leonard Woolf was the one who was actively involved in these processes.

The idea of starting a private press first presented itself in the Woolfs' minds on Virginia's thirty-third birthday, when she wrote that 'sitting at tea, we [Leonard and I] decided three things: in the first place to take Hogarth, if we can get it, in the second, to buy a printing press; in the third, to buy a bull dog' [4]. The couple soon became the owners of Hogarth House in Richmond, London, and established their own private press named after their estate. They never intended Hogarth Press to become politically engaged. Their main reason for buying a printing press was 'to find some sort of engaging relief from their strenuous literary, journalistic, and political activities'.[5] For Virginia Woolf, it also functioned as a form of therapy. Plagued by anxiety and depression her whole life, she found the process of binding and printing books 'exciting, soothing, [...] and satisfying'.[6] Leonard Woolf could also be seen to have a more emotional attitude towards this activity. John Lehmann, the press-manager at Hogarth Press in 1938, has described the Woolfs' close collaboration at the press as a level of intimacy that their marriage never reached. In his memoirs, he wrote: '[To Leonard it was] as if it [the Press] were the child their marriage never produced'.[7]

**"The politicised works published
Press in the 1930s dealt with a
of subjects, a fact that obstruct
as an essentially 'feminist site**

The **Bloomsbury Group** was a small, informal association of artists and intellectuals who lived and worked in the Bloomsbury area of central London.[17]

This emotional attitude towards Hogarth Press exemplifies how 'private' the Woolfs' press initially was. Up to the 1930s, the works published by Hogarth Press were predominantly written by their friends and family. Many of these contributors belonged to the famous **Bloomsbury group**. The publications were mostly works of literature.[5] During the politicised thirties, the publication of political books started to outnumber the literary.[5] However, these political works were not solely focused on advocating forwomen's rights. Another important political theme was for example anti-imperialism, sentiments that particularly Leonard Woolf supported after having served as a civil servant in Sri Lanka. The politicised works published by Hogarth Press in the 1930s thus dealt with a wide range of subjects, a fact that obstructs defining it as an essentially 'feminist site of publication'.[8] Still, it functioned as a 'congenial environment for women's and feminist writing [...] [as it] published a substantial number of such items [...] [therefore] it is [perhaps] best described as feminist friendly'.[8]

This can be attributed to the fact that both founders of the Hogarth Press might be described as feminist. Virginia Woolf wrote some of the most important feminist works of the twentieth century.[9] Leonard Woolf never wrote such daring manifests on women's rights. However, he can be defined as a supporter of feminism, as he shared his wife's ideas on gender equality and the need to abolish the oppression of women.[8] He also became an active member of the Women Co-operative Guild in 1912, which was the same year he wedded his Virginia. In the early letters of their courtship, he had made clear that he wished for equality in marriage, writing that he could not live with an inferior or submissive partner.[10] The Woolfs' marriage, therefore, 'flourished on an ideal of freedom, mutual tolerance and equality [...] unusual for any union entered on as early as 1912'.[11] Leonard Woolf voiced his opinion on women's rights in only one of his early works. In 1920, he listed 'the subjection of women' as a form of 'political evil' besides slavery and torture.[8] It was only later in life, after Virginia Woolf's suicide in 1941 that he seemed to become more properly outspoken about this subject.[8] In 1964, for example, he wrote that 'feminism [is] the belief or policy of all sensible men'.[12]

' by Hogarth wide range ts defining it of publication' ”

When comparing Virginia Woolf's 'deeply radical [and] polemical' feminism with Leonard Woolf's affiliation with the movement, one might expect that it was Virginia who was primarily involved in the publication processes of feminist works at Hogarth Press.[8] Strikingly, it was Leonard who took charge in these matters. This conclusion can be drawn when looking more closely at the publication processes of our three case studies. One of the first feminist writings published at Hogarth Press, the pamphlet *Leisured Women*, was the result of Leonard Woolf's initiative. He had asked the suffragette the Viscountess Rhondda, founder of the feminist magazine *Time and Tide*, to bundle some of her articles into one essay. In *Leisured Women*, she stressed the urgency to continue fighting for women's rights, as she felt that during the interbellum, feminist ideas diminished. Although Virginia Woolf and the Viscountess were acquainted, Virginia was not involved in the publication process. Leonard Woolf studied the drafts and corresponded with the authoress on potential changes. For example, Leonard suggested to change its title to *The Slavery of Leisured Women*, but the Viscountess disagreed.[5] The suggestion indicates that he was not afraid to publish bold feminist manifests, as his addition to the original title would have emphasised the feminist message of the pamphlet.

In 1931, another important feminist work was published at Hogarth Press: *Life as We Have Known It,* a collection of memoirs by working women, edited by the feminist Margaret Llewelyn Davies. This publication showed 'how political the Press had become by then'.[13] In this work, six women wrote about their ordinary lives, 'plain tales of endurance [...] stories [that] told of abuse, exploitation, poverty and fear'.[5] Davies knew the Woolfs, and asked Virginia Woolf

to write a preface. The 'Introductory Letter' sheds light on the limitations of her feminist ideals and shows a detestation of politics that can be related to her disengagement with the publication of feminist works at Hogarth Press. The opening words already signal Virginia's reluctance to contribute to the book: 'When you [Davies] asked me to write a preface to a book which you had collected of papers by working women I replied that I would be drowned rather than write a preface to any book whatsoever'.[14] She takes the reader back to one of her visits to a conference of the Women's Co-operative Guild, where working women addressed topics such as the Divorce Law and minimum wages. Though she does see the point in their arguments, she feels dissociated:

What was the meaning of it? These women were demanding divorce, education, the vote – all good things. [...] All these questions [...] which matter so intensely to the people here, questions of sanitation and education and wages, this demand for an extra shilling, for another year at school, for eight hours instead of nine behind a counter or in a mill, leave me, in my own blood and bones, untouched.[14]
She furthermore criticises the looks and demeanour of these working women: 'their bodies were thick-set and muscular [...] their hands were large [...] they touched nothing lightly. They gripped papers and pencils as if they were brooms [...] Of course they wanted [...] education and seventeen shillings instead of sixteen.' [14]
Virginia Woolf's stance towards these women can be related to her upper class background, as the daughter of a successful journalist, she grew up in a well-off family. She could not remotely identify with these working women and their feminist ideals; and consequently, she could not identify with the book full of tales of female labour and hardship. In her own feminist works, Woolf is mostly concerned with bettering the position of the intellectual or 'refined' woman (writer), and hence she could be accused of advocating a form of 'elitist feminism'. In this 'Introductory Letter', she distances herself from the publication of *Life as We Have Known It,* rather than appearing to support it, as Davies might have hoped. Virginia Woolf's stance towards the activist women of the Women's Co-operative Guild, surfacing in this 'Letter', shows her disengagement with feminist politics that aimed at bettering the position of the average working woman.

The feminist work *Our Freedom and Its Results* was published by Hogarth Press in 1936, a compilation of five works by women writers, edited by the suffragette Ray Strachey. These essays discussed developments in areas such as public life, law, and employment. Strachey herself proposed the idea of *Our Freedom* to Leonard Woolf, and throughout the negotiations, all correspondence was between the two of them.[5] Virginia Woolf was never involved in the project, and had even criticized Strachey for her strong involvement in politics for the feminist cause. In 1918, the year that Strachey grew out to become a leader in the women's movement, she wrote of the negative effects of politics on Strachey:

'Ray is becoming more and more the public woman – floppy, fat, untidy, clumsy, and making fewer concessions than ever to brilliancy, charm, politeness, wit, art, manners [...] [she is] full of news upon women's future of course, but, my God, if *that's* the future, what's the point in it?' [15]

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Here Virginia Woolf's criticism echoes her judgement of the speakers at the Women's Co-operative Guild, and shows a certain detestation of the combination of politics and women, which, in Woolf's opinion, seemed to be accompanied by a loss of femininity and elegance. Her lack of involvement in the publication processes of *Our Freedom* at Hogarth and her critique of Strachey again serves to indicate the limitations of her feminist activism.

Although Virginia Woolf's works are often hailed as bold and progressive pieces of feminist writing, there were thus also limitations to her feminist ideals and political involvement. As John Willis writes, 'the political world of [...] Davies and [...] Strachey [...] seemed absurd and vexatious to Virginia Woolf throughout her life'.(5) Leonard Woolf also wrote that his wife was 'the least political animal that has lived since Aristotle invented the definition'.(16) Yet despite Virginia Woolf's lack of political activism, feminists such as Davies and Strachey continued to respect her. Woolf's *Three Guineas*, for example, 'proved to be so welcome an offensive against enduring male sexist attitude that her sisters in the trenches overlooked her lapses'.(5) Despite entertaining different interpretations of what feminism might entail, their fight against patriarchal oppression was a mutual one.

The Hogarth Press thus did not only publish feminist works that were in line with Virginia Woolf's ideas of feminism. When it grew from a private press to a more politically engaged press, it was Leonard Woolf who was primarily concerned with the publication of the feminist works serving as case studies in this article. His activities at Hogarth Press are valuable to feminist analysis as he was the one proposing and planning the works discussed in this article. This is a surprising find, as one might expect from her status as a feminist icon that Virginia Woolf would have played a larger part in this development. This insight calls for the need to revisit this status, as well as to give more credit to Leonard Woolf than has been given for his involvement as a publisher in the feminist cause.

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